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AN INVESTIGATION OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE: EXPLAINING THE EFFECT OF 
GROUP DISCUSSION ON CONSENSUS IN AUDITORS’ ETHICAL REASONING  
 
 
ABSTRACT: This study introduces Moscovici’s (1976, 1985) model of social influence to the 
accounting research domain, and uses an experiment to assess whether his theory explains how different 
types of discussion affects consensus in auditors’ ethical reasoning. Moscovici’s theory proposes three 
modalities of influence to describe how consensus is achieved following discussion: conformity, 
innovation and normalization. Conformity describes the situation where individuals in the minority 
(e.g., auditors that do not accept the dominant view) accede to the majority (e.g., auditors that hold the 
dominant view) as a result of group discussion. Innovation describes the situation where individuals in 
the majority accede to the minority. Normalization describes the situation where there is reciprocal 
influence.  
 
We find that conformity occurs when auditors are asked to prescriptively discuss what ideally “should” 
be the resolution to an ethical dilemma. Normalization occurs when auditors are asked to deliberatively 
discuss what realistically would be the resolution to an ethical dilemma. The results of this study 
suggest that prescriptive discussion of an ethical dilemma encourages auditor groups to strive to find the 
best response to a moral dilemma if it is represented by the majority view. In contrast, deliberative 
discussion of an ethical dilemma may encourage the elimination of multiple viewpoints. The results of 
this study have important implications for understanding the social influence process that affects 
auditors’ ethical reasoning. 
 
Key Words: ethical reasoning, audit groups, social influence, and consensus. 
 
Data Availability: Contact the first author. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Group decision-making plays a key role in most of the critical decisions made by auditors 
over the course of the audit (Rich, Solomon and Trotman 1997). As a result, the discussion that takes 
place during key meetings among the audit team or among a group of partners has a significant 
impact on the final outcome of many contentious ethical issues. For instance, consider the following 
excerpt from Arthur Andersen audit partner, Michael Jones, in his documentation of the critical 
meeting attended by key Andersen partners to discuss their concerns over the Enron account: 
We discussed Enron’s dependence on transaction execution to meet financial 
objectives, the fact that Enron often is creating industries and markets and 
transactions for which there are no specific rules, which requires significant judgment 
and that Enron is aggressive in its transaction structuring. We discussed consultation 
among the engagement team, with Houston management, practice management and 
the PSG [Professional Services Group] to ensure that we are not making decisions in 
isolation. 
Ultimately, the conclusion was reached to retain Enron as a client citing that it 
appeared that we had the appropriate people and processes in place to serve Enron 
and manage our engagement risks. We discussed whether there would be a perceived 
independence issue solely considering our level of fees. We discussed that the 
concerns should not be the magnitude of fees but on the nature of fees. 
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Given their concerns, one wonders how the Andersen partners arrived at their decision to 
retain Enron as a client. In particular, we wonder which type of social influence describes the process 
that occurred during this meeting. Would the outcome have been different if different individuals 
attended the meeting? Would the outcome have been different if the partners attempted to develop an 
“ideal” solution rather than a compromise?  
 To that end, we use Moscovici’s theory of social influence to investigate the type of consensus 
achieved by groups of auditors following discussion of ethical dilemmas.  In this paper, consensus refers 
to the degree to which group members modify their ethical reasoning following group discussion. Prior 
research investigating the effect of discussion on auditors’ professional judgment has focused almost 
exclusively on the technical component of auditors’ professional judgement and has not investigated 
how discussion influences auditors’ professional judgment with an inherent ethical dimension. Yet, 
unlike technical judgments where there is a “single right answer” for auditors’ judgments, multiple 
viewpoints are often considered acceptable for auditors’ judgments of an ethical nature (Gaa 1993; 
Francis 1990). Consequently, the effect of discussion on auditors’ ethical judgments may be quite 
different than the effect of discussion on judgments of a purely technical nature. 
Prior research investigating auditors’ ethical reasoning (e.g., Arnold, Bernardi, and Neidermeyer 
1999; Bernardi and Arnold 1997; Louwers, Ponemon and Radtke 1997; Ponemon 1993; Ponemon and 
Gabhart 1993) has made significant inroads through the adoption of a cognitive-developmental 
perspective (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999). The cognitive-developmental perspective 
focuses its investigation on the ethical reasoning process that precipitates an ethical judgment. 
Accounting research employing the cognitive-developmental approach shows that auditors’ ethical 
reasoning is sensitive to social influence (Lord and DeZoort 2001; Ponemon and Gabhart 1993; 
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Ponemon 1992), and of particular interest to this study, also demonstrates that auditors’ ethical 
reasoning becomes significantly revised as a result of discussion of ethical dilemmas with a group of 
peers (Thorne and Hartwick 2001). However, it is not yet understood to what extent auditor discussion 
of ethical dilemmas alleviates or eliminates the multiple viewpoints auditors may have of ethical 
dilemmas. 
To increase our understanding of whether auditors’ discussion of ethical dilemmas alleviates or 
eliminates their multiple viewpoints, this study uses Moscovici’s (1976, 1985) theory of social influence 
as a basis to investigate the form of social influence that affects auditors’ ethical reasoning. Moscovici’s 
theory is particularly appropriate for examining the effect of discussion of ethical dilemmas because it 
considers how different views (i.e., minority and majority) persist depending upon individuals’ 
perceptions of a “best” response. Moscovici (1985) posits that depending upon contextual factors, three 
possible outcomes may occur. They are: 1) conformity: convergence to the majority position by the 
minority; 2) innovation: the acceptance of the minority view by the majority; or, 3) normalization: 
revision of both the majority and minority views so that a compromise view prevails. 
This study uses 180 auditors in an experiment to investigate the extent to which auditors in the 
majority and/or minority revise their ethical reasoning after engaging in discussion of ethical dilemmas 
with peers. The experiment tests hypotheses developed through the application of Moscovici’s theory 
(1980, 1985) in a cognitive-developmental framework. The results show that when auditors are asked to 
prescriptively discuss what “should” be the resolution to an ethical dilemma, the majority view prevails 
(i.e., there is conformity), particularly when the majority is of higher ethical development than the 
minority.  In contrast, when auditors are asked to deliberatively discuss what realistically would be done 
to resolve an ethical dilemma, both the majority and the minority revise their views (i.e., there is 
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normalization). Although ethical dilemmas do not have a “single right answer”, prescriptive discussion 
appears to evoke a search for the “best” response, which auditors appear to interpret as the view of the 
majority. In contrast, deliberative discussion appears to promote the “acceptability of compromise”, 
which results in a reduction in multiple viewpoints among auditors.  
Accordingly, this study contributes to our understanding of factors that affect how auditors reach 
consensus when considering ethical dilemmas. Besides being of interest to auditors and researchers 
studying auditors’ ethics, these findings have important implications for those developing training 
programs to ensure that auditors maintain a high ethical standard in the resolution of ethical dilemmas. 
Ethical Reasoning: Theory and Findings 
Cognitive-developmental theory assumes that an individual’s conception of morality or 
ethics, as indicated by his or her level of ethical development, affects the way that he or she will 
resolve ethical dilemmas. Individuals at higher levels of ethical development are able to make more 
sophisticated ethical decisions (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma 1999). The cognitive-
developmental approach has been successfully used in applied research to describe the ethical 
decision process of auditors (Bernardi and Arnold 1997; Louwers, Ponemon and Radtke 1997; 
Lampe and Finn 1992). Of specific importance to this study are four accounting studies that 
investigate social influence and ethical reasoning: Ponemon (1990), Ponemon and Gabhart (1993), 
Lord and DeZoort (2001), and Thorne and Hartwick (2001). All four of the accounting studies have 
employed an experimental approach within a cognitive-developmental framework. Ponemon (1990) 
and Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) identify the importance of social influence on ethical reasoning by 
demonstrating that accounting students’ propensity to underreport time increases when peer 
comparisons are available. Lord and DeZoort (2001) demonstrate the importance of the origins of 
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social influence by showing that social pressure from superiors increases auditors’ willingness to 
sign off on a materially misstated account balance; however, social pressure from peers does not.  
Thorne and Hartwick (2001) use an experiment to consider the directional effect of discussion 
on auditors’ subsequent consideration of realistic audit-specific ethical dilemmas. Auditors were asked 
to prescriptively discuss how an accountant ideally should resolve an ethical dilemma, or to deliberately 
discuss how an accountant actually would resolve an ethical dilemma. Thorne and Hartwick (2001) find 
that auditors’ ethical reasoning scores are significantly different than control group subjects’ scores after 
discussion and the direction of the difference in ethical reasoning scores varies according to the type of 
discussion with peers (i.e., prescriptive or deliberative); auditors have higher ethical reasoning scores 
after prescriptive discussion and lower ethical reasoning scores after deliberative discussion. Although 
Thorne and Hartwick (2001) identify that type of discussion (i.e., prescriptive or deliberative) may play 
an important role in auditors’ ethical reasoning, they did not explore how discussion affects majority 
and minority views of an ethical dilemma. Thus, we do not yet know the extent to which auditor 
discussion of ethical dilemmas affects consensus, in terms of conformity, innovation or normalization. 
The Effect of Discussion on Auditors’ Professional Judgement 
Existing audit research investigating the effect of discussion on auditors’ professional judgments 
typically examine how discussion affects auditors’ professional judgments of a technical nature (e.g., 
Bamber, Watson and Hill 1996; Wright 1988; Ashton 1985; Abdel-khalik, Snowball and Wragge 1983; 
Reckers and Schultz 1982; Schultz and Reckers 1981). This stream of accounting research applies and 
considers, implicitly or explicitly, hypotheses derived from the classical model of social influence 
(Solomon 1982, 1987). The classical model of social influence characterizes the influence of discussion 
on decisions (such as technical judgments) that have clear-cut answers and the majority represents the 
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“right” decision. Asch (1951, 1955) conducted a series of experiments that compared responses from 
solitary individuals to responses made by individuals following others. The results of these experiments 
strongly affected the classical model of social influence by demonstrating that individuals’ judgments 
generally conform to the response made by the majority. Thousands of replications and variations of 
Asch’s experiments have established the applicability of the phenomenon of conformity for situations 
where decisions have clear-cut answers, across numerous contexts and under various conditions. For 
example, the phenomenon has been found to persist even after the subjects were removed from the 
social situation and even in situations where subjects were not required to expose their own position 
publicly (Moscovici 1985).  
The courts, regulators and the audit profession typically use agreement among experts as a 
surrogate for “accuracy” in auditors’ professional judgment when no objective criterion is available 
(Pincus 1990; Ashton 1985; Libby and Lewis 1982). The research studies that have investigated 
agreement among auditors show that auditors’ judgments are more similar and more accurate after 
discussion than before (Arnold, Sutton, Hayne, and Smith 2000; Solomon 1987). However, for 
decisions that are highly interpretative in nature, empirical results (Keasey and Watson 1989; Einhorn 
1974) reveal that social pressure can cause individuals to converge to a “wrong” or inferior answer 
when the majority is not necessarily “right”. In particular, experimental evidence shows that interacting 
groups often agree immediately and unanimously on the conclusion advanced by the majority, which in 
interpretive decision settings, can often be the wrong one (Barnlund 1959).  
Thus, the classical model of social influence facilitates our understanding of how discussion 
influences professional judgment of a technical nature where the “best” response is a single, correct 
response and is generally represented by those in the majority (e.g., Asch 1951, 1955). However, as 
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demonstrated by the Enron situation, ethical dilemmas are generally ambiguous and a single correct 
response is not usually evident. This suggests that the classical model may not apply to all situations of 
social influence. Instead, we believe Moscovici’s (1976, 1985) model of social influence appropriate for 
considering how discussion influences the multiple viewpoints held by auditors considering ethical 
dilemmas.  
Moscovici’s (1976, 1985) model of social influence is based on the premise that when 
individuals face opposing or different views, they experience conflict and try to redefine their own 
views in order to reduce that conflict. It is at this point that they are open to influence from others and 
attempt to influence others. Although Moscovici’s model recognizes that social influence generally 
results in consensus to the majority view to end the conflict (i.e., conformity as generally described in 
Asch’s (1951, 1955) experiments), in some situations the minority view was adopted by the majority or 
the minority view appeared to result in the majority modifying their view. Moreover, although 
conformity to the majority view generally leads to public change in judgment, it rarely leads to private 
change in judgment (Nemeth 1985). Because of these findings, Moscovici and his colleagues (e.g., 
Moscovici and Faucheaux 1972) began to consider contextual characteristics of the situation that may 
affect social influence, and identified two key characteristics associated with different types of social 
influence: 1) individuals’ perceptions that a “best” response exists (i.e., the norms concerning 
objectivity versus pluralism) (Moscovici 1985); and 2) the perceived legitimacy of the majority and 
minority views.  
Thus, Moscovici (1985) identifies three modalities of social influence: conformity, 
normalization, and innovation. Each modality is considered to be as fundamental as the other is; the 
modality of social influence depends upon the nature of the conflict and the interaction among the 
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individuals. Conformity occurs when there is a search for the “best” response to a conflict and the 
majority view is recognized as legitimate. This is the situation that is described in Asch’s (1951, 1955) 
experiments. The minority accedes to the majority and stability of the beliefs of the majority is 
maintained. Normalization occurs when there is a search for a reasonable solution to a conflict and it is 
recognized that several desirable different views may exist simultaneously. Sherif (1935) demonstrated 
this modality of influence by studying the averaging of beliefs through gradual compromises and 
successive stabilization. Innovation occurs when there is a search for the “best” response to a conflict 
and the minority view is recognized as legitimate. In this case, the minority is considered to be 
legitimate because for some reason there is a desire for novelty in the resolution of the conflict (Levine 
and Russo 1987). 
Prescriptive Discussion, the Norm of Objectivity, and Conformity 
In our experiment, we envision that the type of discussion sets the norms of the situation. 
Prescriptive discussion involves individuals exchanging views of what ideally should be done to 
resolve a particular ethical dilemma (Kohlberg 1958). The cognitive-developmental perspective 
advocates that the prescriptive response is the “ideal” or most desirable ethical response (Rest, 
Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma 1999). Moscovici (1985) posits that when a “best” response is desirable 
(i.e., what he refers to as the norm of objectivity), convergence to either the majority or minority 
view is the most likely outcome. Several studies in social psychology have supported the application 
of Moscovici’s theory to situations involving objective, prescriptive norms by showing that when the 
influence situation is based upon the norm of objectivity, views will converge to the majority and 
minority (Maas and Clark 1984; Nemeth and Wachter 1983).  
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Moscovici’s theory also suggests that the convergence of group members’ views to those 
espoused by the majority or minority will depend upon the legitimacy of the particular views. That is, 
so long as the majority (minority) view is considered legitimate, convergence to the majority 
(minority) view will occur. Social influence research has measured legitimacy in many different 
ways. Some have taken a behavioral approach and considered the consistency of the view 
(particularly in the case of the minority dissenter) (Nemeth 1994). Others have considered it from the 
basis of normative power of the majority or the minority (Perez, Mugny, Butera, Kaiser and Roux 
1994). We consider the legitimacy of the majority and the minority in the context of the audit 
profession. When considering the appropriate response to ethical dilemmas, auditors tend to rely 
upon laws or rules and court decisions (c.f., Massey 2002; Bernardi and Arnold 1997; Sweeney 
1995; Lampe and Finn 1992; Ponemon 1990, 1992). Further, regulators and the audit profession 
typically recognize agreement among experts as a surrogate for accuracy when no objective criterion 
is available (Pincus 1990; Ashton 1985; Libby and Lewis 1982). Therefore, in the case of 
prescriptive discussion of ethical dilemmas, we would expect auditors in the minority to converge to 
the majority view after engaging in prescriptive discussion of an ethical dilemma. 
Thus, consistent with conformity, we would expect the views of those auditors in the 
minority to change more than the views of those auditors in the majority following prescriptive 
discussion of an ethical dilemma. This gives rise to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a greater magnitude of revision in minority members’ ethical reasoning 
as compared to majority members’ ethical reasoning following auditors’ prescriptive 
discussion of an ethical dilemma. 
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Deliberative Discussion, the Norm of Pluralism, and Normalization 
Deliberative discussion involves individuals exchanging views of what realistically is done to 
resolve a particular situation (Scharf 1973). The effect of deliberative discussion on individuals’ ethical 
reasoning may be found in several studies (e.g., Higgins, Power and Kohlberg 1984; Scharf 1973). For 
example, when attempting to set up an ethical education program for inmates, Scharf (1973) observed 
that inmates’ deliberative discussion reflected the norms that existed in a particular context, and not 
what they believed was “right.” Deliberative discussion appeared to reinforce the acceptance of a 
compromise (Higgins, Power and Kohlberg 1984), and suggests that several reasonable solutions 
(multiple views) may simultaneously exist. We consider deliberative discussion to be a situation where 
acquiescence to multiple views (i.e., the norm of pluralism) prevails (Moscovici 1985). Thus, 
deliberative discussion does not attempt to evoke a determination of a “best” response, but instead 
deliberative discussion evokes tacit acceptance that several reasonable solutions may coexist. As 
applied to understanding the effect of deliberative discussion on auditors’ ethical reasoning, this 
evidence suggests that the ethical reasoning of individuals holding majority and minority views are 
affected by and affect deliberative discussion. This in turn suggests that deliberative discussion invites a 
compromise between majority and minority points of view, which is consistent with normalization. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis suggests that majority and minority views are both 
subject to and the source of social influence after deliberative discussion. This gives rise to the second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference between the magnitude of the revision of 
majority members’ ethical reasoning and minority members’ ethical reasoning following 
auditors’ deliberative discussion of an ethical dilemma. 
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EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH AND MEASURES 
 
This study uses a three-phase experiment to examine whether social influence can explain the 
effect of group discussion on consensus in auditors’ ethical reasoning. The first phase of the experiment 
was the pretest to establish auditors’ baseline ethical reasoning scores before they participated in group 
discussion of the ethical dilemmas. In the second phase of the experiment, subjects participated in either 
prescriptive or deliberative group discussion about the resolution of the ethical dilemmas. Prescriptive 
discussion is operationalized in the experiment by asking auditors to discuss what ideally should be 
done to resolve a realistic ethical dilemma, whereas deliberative discussion is operationalized in the 
experiment by asking auditors to assess what actually would be done in response to a realistic ethical 
dilemma. In the third phase of the experiment, subjects completed the posttest.  
Many studies of social influence have determined that individuals change their latent judgments, 
such those encompassed in ethical reasoning, because the source of influence had some sort of 
normative or informational power that has the ability to sway them (e.g., Perez, Mugny, Butera, Kaiser 
and Roux 1994). In order to determine if the auditors changed their ethical reasoning to maintain 
consensus, the experiment is designed to minimize any normative or informational influences in three 
ways. First, given that public responses tend to make subjects more susceptible to normative influence, 
the auditors privately report their ethical reasoning and are instructed not to discuss the instruments that 
they completed in the first phase. Second, awareness that ones’ views are consistent with the majority 
(minority) have also been shown to influence the subjects’ responses (Erb, Bohner, Rank and Einwiller 
2002). Some theorize that awareness of the minority and majority views evoke social identification and 
self-categorization (Perez, Mugny, Butera, Kaiser and Roux 1994). To minimize this potential affect, 
the subjects are unaware of whether they are a minority or a majority within their group. Finally, the 
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subjects are randomly assigned to the groups and there is no indication that they should be or are 
different from their fellow group members.   
The experiments require auditors to engage in group discussion of four realistic ethical 
dilemmas. Because empirical evidence suggests that auditors generally interact with between three-to-
five other individuals when making professional judgments (Rich, Solomon and Trotman 1997; Gibbins 
and Mason 1988), discussion groups are composed of five auditors. The discussion groups are further 
classified as one of two types: high and low. High (low) discussion groups have a majority with ethical 
development scores above (below) the median. Since ethical development indicates how an individual 
considers ethical issues, it is assumed that different levels of ethical development will evoke different 
responses during the discussion. 
Additionally, each type of discussion group (high and low) has four majority members and one 
minority member. Prior research (Clark 1999, 308) finds a “ceiling of influence” on group consensus 
decisions at three or four sources of influence; therefore, we selected a group size of five, with one 
minority and four majority members, to ensure that individuals were exposed to the maximum number 
of sources of influence. An auditor is classified as a majority (minority) group member in a high group 
if his or her level of ethical development is above (below) the median. Conversely, an auditor is 
classified as a majority (minority) group member in a low group if his or her level of ethical reasoning is 
below (above) the median. 
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Participants 
One hundred and eighty auditors provided usable data in the pretest and participated in the 
experimental discussion groups1. Fifty-one percent of the experimental sample is male, and on average 
the sample has four years of post-secondary education and a mean age of 28 years. Thirty four percent 
of the sample has obtained their Chartered Accountant (CA) designation. Subjects are randomly 
assigned to a particular experimental condition (i.e., prescriptive or deliberative). There are no 
significant differences across descriptive characteristics found between subjects assigned to prescriptive 
and deliberative conditions (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
Auditors included in the sample all have work experience in Canadian public accounting firms, 
representing a wide range of firm sizes. Thirty-eight percent (n=68) of subjects in the sample are 
employed by a multinational firm; fifty percent (n=90) are employed by a mid-size national firm, while 
the remaining twelve percent (n=22) are employed by a small regional firm. The sample includes 
auditors at all hierarchical levels from staff to manager, however it does not include managers from 
small firms due to their unavailability. 
                                                 
1
 Note that those who did not provide complete, usable data for the pretest are omitted from the analysis. Thus, these 
subjects were grouped together to discuss the ethical dilemmas, but they were not required to prescriptively or 
deliberatively discuss the dilemmas and their responses were not analyzed. 
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Approach 
First, auditors complete the traditional three-case general DIT (Rest et al. 1999) and one version 
(prescriptive or deliberative) of the audit-specific four-case measure (Thorne 2000) of auditors’ ethical 
reasoning  (see Appendix 1 for a copy of the experimental instructions). The DIT measures the 
individuals’ ethical development or the cognitive structures that they use to resolve everyday ethical 
dilemmas; therefore, it is considered to represent their ethical view on the world (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau 
and Thoma 1999). The audit-specific four-case instrument is patterned after the DIT in format and 
measures the type of ethical reasoning used in evaluating professional dilemmas common to auditors. 
The reliability and validity of the audit-specific instrument is better or comparable to that of the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) of a similar length (Thorne 2000). We instruct the auditors to not discuss the 
study materials until the ultimate conclusion of the study, following phase III. We then use the auditors’ 
pretest scores on the DIT to assign auditors to a majority or minority condition in either a high or low 
group for the group discussion.  
Approximately one-week later, auditors are given 40 minutes to either prescriptively or 
deliberatively discuss the audit-specific, ethical dilemmas with four of their peers who receive the same 
version of the audit-specific measure (prescriptive or deliberative). The auditors participate in the type 
of discussion that is consistent with the experimental materials in the pretest (i.e., prescriptive or 
deliberative). Following the group discussion, auditors are requested to again individually complete the 
audit-specific measure (prescriptive or deliberative). The revision to auditors’ ethical reasoning scores is 
operationalized as the absolute value of the difference between an auditor’s ethical reasoning score 
taken before discussion from his or her ethical reasoning score after discussion. We consider this 
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revision in the auditors’ ethical reasoning score to be the change in their latent judgment after the 
auditors take part in discussion that attempts to reduce their conflict and achieve consensus. 
Experimental Manipulations 
There are four experimental manipulations, the first two are directly associated with the 
experimental hypotheses and the last two are included in the experimental design to control for and 
eliminate other possible explanations for the experimental results. The first manipulation is the TYPE of 
discussion (i.e., prescriptive or deliberative discussion). The second manipulation is GROUP, which 
represents auditors’ assignment to the majority or minority condition. The third manipulation is 
auditors’ LEVEL of ethical development. The fourth manipulation is auditors’ assignment to a 
predominately high or predominately low CONTEXT based upon whether their discussion group is 
composed mainly of auditors with relatively high or relatively low levels of ethical development. Each 
is discussed in turn.  
Assignment to Discussion Condition (TYPE) 
 
In the experiment, auditors are randomly assigned to the Prescriptive or Deliberative discussion 
conditions (TYPE) depending upon the version of the audit-specific measure they receive. Each version 
of the instrument is similar to the other except that each version elicits one particular TYPE of auditors’ 
ethical reasoning. The prescriptive version of the audit-specific instrument requests subjects to consider 
how the described dilemmas ideally, should be resolved by auditors (see Appendix 1). The deliberative 
version of the audit-specific instrument requests subjects to consider how the described dilemmas 
realistically, would be resolved by auditors.  
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Assignment to Majority or Minority Condition (GROUP) 
In the experiment, auditors are assigned to the majority and minority conditions (GROUP) 
according to their level of cognitive moral development. As individuals with similar levels of cognitive 
moral development view ethical issues according to similar cognitive structures (c.f., Rest et al. 1999), 
level of ethical reasoning is used to designate subjects to the majority or the minority GROUP based 
upon their level of ethical reasoning relative to others in the discussion group. Auditors’ ethical 
reasoning is measured using subject’s P-score on the Thorne’s (2000) four-case measure of ethical 
reasoning.  
Thorne’s (2000) instrument is modeled after Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test. The instrument 
requires the subjects use to rank those issues that, in their opinion, have the most significant influence 
on the resolution of each dilemma. The instrument provides several responses that are the most typical 
modes of thinking in terms of cognitive-developmental theory (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma 
1999). In scoring each vignette, points are assigned to each of the subject’s responses using an interval 
scale of 1 to 4 points for the least important to the most important. Subject rankings on the four 
vignettes are then combined in determining subjects’ P-scores – the percentage of principled 
considerations a subject uses in resolving the moral dilemmas – for the instrument. Thorne (2000) 
reports that the reliability of the P score on her four-case measure of ethical reasoning is comparable or 
better to that for the three-story DIT. She reports (2000, 149) test-retest reliability of .79 (.71) on the 
prescriptive (deliberative) version of her instrument. Thorne (2000, 147) also reports internal 
consistency, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, of .75 (.65) for the prescriptive (deliberative) version of 
her instrument.  
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Assignment to Higher or Lower Level of Ethical Development (LEVEL) 
To ensure that the results are not confounded by auditors’ ethical development or due to the 
overall ethical development of the discussion groups, the experimental design crosses auditors’ level of 
ethical development (LEVEL) with different average levels of ethical development of the discussion 
groups (CONTEXT). Auditors are randomly assigned to a LEVEL condition (Higher, Lower) based on 
their general level of ethical development, as assessed on the pre-manipulation general DIT. Auditors 
with levels of ethical development above the median of the sample are designated as having a Higher 
Level of ethical development and auditors with levels of ethical development below the median of the 
sample are designated as having a Lower Level of ethical development. 
Auditors’ level of ethical development is measured using each subject’s P-score on the three-
case Defining Issues Test (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma 1999). The reliability of the P-score on 
the three-case DIT ranges from about the upper sixties and seventies for the three-case DIT for both 
test-retest reliability and internal consistency (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma 1999).   
 Assignment to High and Low Discussion Groups (CONTEXT) 
Auditors are randomly assigned to High and Low discussion groups (CONTEXT) based upon 
their LEVEL. High Groups are composed of four auditors at a higher level of ethical development and 
one auditor at a lower level of ethical development. Low Groups are composed of four auditors at a 
lower level of ethical development and one auditor at a higher level of ethical development.  
Consequently, MAJORITY members are auditors at “higher” levels of ethical development in High 
Groups, and auditors at “lower” levels of ethical development in Low Groups. MINORITY members 
are auditors at “lower” levels of ethical development in High Groups, and auditors at “higher” levels of 
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ethical development in Low Groups2. Table 2 shows group composition according to DIT score and 
compares the level of ethical development of auditors assigned to the MAJORITY and the MAJORITY 
condition, across the experimental conditions. 
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
As per Table 2, MAJORITY members in High Groups have significantly higher levels of ethical 
development than MINORITY members in High Groups, and MAJORITY members in Low Groups 
have significantly lower levels of ethical development than MINORITY members in Low Groups 
(p<0.00 in all cases). 
Revision to Auditors’ Ethical Reasoning 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the revision to auditors’ ethical reasoning scores from 
the pretest to the posttest. The dependent variable is operationalized as the absolute value (i.e., 
ABSOLUTE_REVISION) of the difference between an auditor’s P score on Thorne’s (2000) measure 
of ethical reasoning taken before discussion from his or her P score on Thorne’s (2000) measure of 
ethical reasoning taken after discussion. 
 
                                                 
2
 Statistical techniques are used to ensure that the results are attributable to differences in the MAJORITY and the 
MINORITY and not to differences in DIT scores of auditors and audit groups. 
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RESULTS 
Results for Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 posits that prescriptive discussion results in a significantly greater revision to the 
ethical reasoning scores of minority group members than majority group members. We use a 2 x 2 x 9 
(LEVEL x CONTEXT x GROUP nested within CONTEXT) ANOVA to test hypothesis 1 and 
examine the effects of discussion on the revision to the ethical reasoning scores of auditors in the 
prescriptive condition. We use the variable, GROUP nested within CONTEXT, rather than GROUP 
to assess hypothesis 1 because GROUP  (majority or minority group membership) is inextricably linked 
to CONTEXT (whether the subject is in a high or low group). That is, majority or minority GROUP 
membership is inseparable from CONEXT.  
 
Table 3 about here. 
 
For subjects in the prescriptive condition, Table 3 reports significance for the variable, GROUP 
nested within CONTEXT (p<0.02), which suggests that the revisions to prescriptive reasoning of 
auditors in the majority and minority conditions (GROUP) are statistically different according to high 
and low groups (CONTEXT). This finding suggests there may be support for Hypothesis 1. However, 
further investigation testing the directional implications of this finding is required.  
Table 4 shows that for auditors in the minority, the absolute revision to prescriptive reasoning 
scores was significantly greater (at p=0.03) than the absolute revision to prescriptive reasoning scores of 
auditors in the majority. Thus, the results support Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 4 about here. 
 
Results for Hypothesis 2 
To test whether deliberative discussion results in the normalization of auditors’ ethical 
reasoning, Hypothesis 2 postulates that there is no significant difference in the magnitude of the 
revision to the ethical reasoning between group members in the majority as compared to those in the 
minority. To look at the differential effect of deliberative discussion on group members more closely, 
Table 5 compares the absolute revision to the ethical reasoning scores of majority and minority 
GROUP auditors who engage in deliberative discussion. 
The results of Table 5 show no significant difference between the absolute revision to the 
deliberative ethical reasoning of auditors assigned to the majority condition and auditors assigned to 
the minority condition (p<0.13)3.  This result contrasts with that found for prescriptive discussion 
where, consistent with the conformity hypothesis, there is a significantly greater revision in the 
ethical reasoning of those in the minority than in the majority4. 
 
Table 5 about here. 
 
                                                 
3
 In addition, previous research shows that there is a significant revision only to the ethical reasoning scores of 
auditors engaged in discussion (both prescriptive and deliberative discussion) while there is no significant revision to 
the ethical reasoning scores of auditors in an individual control condition who do not engage in discussion (Thorne 
and Hartwick 2001). 
4
 To ensure that the results of this comparison are not attributable to level or context, a 2 (LEVEL) by 2 
(CONTEXT) by 9 (GROUP nested within CONTEXT) ANOVA examines the effects of discussion on the ethical 
reasoning scores of auditors assigned to the deliberative condition. The results of this ANOVA suggests that 
deliberative discussion does not result in a significant difference in the magnitude of the revision to MINORITY or 
MAJORITY auditors’ ethical reasoning. 
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DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
This study introduces Moscovici’s (1976, 1985) model of social influence to the accounting 
research domain, and integrates Moscovici’s theory with the cognitive-developmental perspective on 
ethical reasoning. This paper uses Moscovici’s theory as a basis for understanding how group 
discussion may affect consensus in auditors’ ethical reasoning. By so doing, this research provides 
insight into factors that may affect the achievement of consensus in auditors’ professional judgment of 
an ethical nature. The results of this study show that the influence of discussion of ethical dilemmas 
differentially affects auditors’ minority and majority views, and this influence varies according to type 
of discussion that takes place. Prescriptive discussion appears to cause convergence in the minority’s 
reasoning to the majority view (i.e., conformity), whereas deliberative discussion appears to cause 
normalization in auditors’ ethical reasoning.  
Moscovici’s (1985) theory appears to be particularly appropriate for understanding the effect 
of discussion on ethical reasoning because the interpretative nature of ethical dilemmas may give those 
in the minority, as well as the majority, the scope and the latitude for influence. The audit literature’s 
historical reliance on the classical social-psychological perspective may have contributed to the 
widespread acceptance of substantive agreement as desirable in auditors’ professional judgement. The 
results of this study suggest that for professional judgments with an inherent ethical component, lack of 
substantive agreement may not be a reflection of auditors’ incompetence or inaccuracy but may merely 
be a reflection of the characteristics of the type of decision itself. This in turn suggests that lack of 
agreement among auditors is not necessarily bad or negative, but may be acceptable when considering 
professional judgments of an ethical nature. Furthermore, it may be inferred from the findings of Thorne 
and Hartwick (2001) that the cost of consensus for auditors considering pragmatic resolutions to 
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professional ethical judgments may unfortunately be a deterioration in ethical reasoning as auditors tend 
to compromise when striving for the “actual” (versus “ideal”) resolution to a particular ethical dilemma. 
Indeed, in the case of the Enron meeting, perhaps if the partners attempted to discuss what they ideally 
should do, and focus on the professional principals of integrity, due care, and objectivity, it is possible 
that the conclusion the partners reached would have been different.  
Further work, with particular consideration to the legitimacy of multiple viewpoints inherent 
in particular auditing contexts and judgments, is needed to provide additional insights into 
understanding factors that affect majority and minority views.  The explicit or implicit encouragement 
of acceptance of a single “right” response through the use of practices and procedures adopted by 
auditors (e.g., standardized audit protocols, decision-aids and consultation groups) may sometimes be 
misguided as implied in the multiple audit failures that have recently occurred. Additional care is 
needed to determine the type of social influence that will affect auditors’ ethical decision process and 
whether majority and/or minority influence should be encouraged and/or discouraged in the formulation 
of auditors’ professional judgement. Of particular relevance is the stream of research that demonstrates 
that a consistent and committed minority has the ability to change the views of the majority and to 
encourage innovative and creative decisions (Nemeth, Brown, and Rogers 2001; Nemeth 1994). 
Perhaps Arthur Andersen would not have accepted Enron’s aggressive reporting if processes were in 
place that encouraged a “devil’s advocate” role. Future research should consider what conditions 
encourage the majority and the minority views to dominate and/or recede, and what contexts encourage 
or discourage similarity in auditors’ judgments. 
We also see potential for future research in considering the role of courage in social 
influence. Some preliminary research indicates that courage and a sense of conviction improves the 
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quality of group decisions (Nemeth and Chiles 1998). Since courage is a necessary virtue of an auditor 
(Libby and Thorne 2003), it may help explain how auditors resist social influence or are able to 
influence the outcome of group discussions.  
A few caveats are in order in interpreting the conclusions of the study. The first caveat is with 
regard to the size and nature of the sample. A significant effort was made to obtain a sufficient number 
of subjects with a wide range of auditing experience. Replication of this study with an even greater 
number of subjects will increase our assurance that its results are representative. Furthermore, this study 
should also be replicated using groups of different sizes and different compositions of majority and 
minority members. In addition, the applicability of the results of this study to auditors not included in 
the sample (e.g., audit partners and sole practitioners) and to organizations that are not audit firms 
remains to be established. 
The second caveat is with regard to the nature of the setting in which the study was carried out. 
The nature of the experiment required the interaction of a large number of auditors; consequently, it was 
conducted during audit firms’ training courses or during class time of courses attended by accountants 
for professional accreditation. However, using locations and contexts that are not representative of the 
location or context in which these discussions usually are made may have hindered the elicitation of 
realistic discussion. For instance, by design, the discussion groups included auditors at similar 
hierarchical ranks; therefore, the results of the experiment may not apply to situations where different 
hierarchical levels are involved in-group discussion. Since hierarchy and accountability can influence 
the outcome of audit group and individual decisions this is an important area for future research (Rich, 
Solomon and Trotman 1997), we envision that a hierarchical setting would evoke normative pressures 
not present in our current study.  
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The third caveat is with regard to the types of discussion elicited in the experimental 
manipulations. The experimental instructions and procedures attempted to ensure that a single type of 
discussion was encouraged in each experiment. Manipulation checks and researcher observation 
confirmed that groups engaged in discussion in the assigned mode (i.e., prescriptive or deliberative). 
Thus, this study did not examine the effect of social interaction on auditors’ resolution of ethical 
dilemmas when discussion involved both types of ethical reasoning, either simultaneously or 
sequentially. Additional work is required to ascertain the effect of social influence on auditors’ 
resolution of ethical dilemmas when both types of discussion are involved. 
Finally, the study examined auditors’ ethical reasoning immediately after the group discussion.  
The experiment was not designed to determine whether the effect of discussion is persistent over time. 
Future investigations to ascertain the longevity of the effect of a single discussion on auditors’ ethical 
reasoning and to ascertain the influence of repeated conversations on auditors’ ethical reasoning are 
likely to be of interest to those concerned with understanding how social influence affects auditors’ 
ethical reasoning. 
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Appendix 1: Prescriptive Instrument and Experiment Instructions (Phases II and III) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
I. CONTENTS AND DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS 
 
In addition to a copy of these instructions to be distributed to each member of the group, this envelope 
should contain: 
1) five envelopes with identification codes of each of the group members on the outside; 
2) five two-page case descriptions (one for each member), and 
3) one one-page response sheet (one for the entire group). 
 
Please distribute to each member of the group one two-page case description and his or her envelope with 
his or her identification code written on the outside. These envelopes are not be to opened until the group 
discussion has been completed. 
 
II.  GROUP DISCUSSION 
 
During this session you will be asked to discuss four accounting cases that were included in the preparatory 
material. Your group should allocate about 10 minutes per case to the discussion of each case. Consider that 
your group is a professional disciplinary committee whose role is to determine and describe the ideal 
response to this ethical dilemma. The focus of the discussion should be on which factors are important to the 
resolution of the professional dilemma described in each case as required by the attached form. After 
discussing each case, please complete the attached response sheet that has room for you to describe: 1) how 
the dilemma ideally should be resolved by a professional accountant, and 2) the four factors which are most 
important to its resolution. Be sure to give each and every member of your group a chance to express his/her 
opinion. You may start now. 
 
After completing the discussion of all four cases, please return the attached form and the two-page case 
descriptions to the original envelope and seal it shut. 
 
II.  INDIVIDUAL ENVELOPES 
 
On an individual basis, each group member is to open the envelope with his or her identification code and 
follow the instructions included inside.  
 
If at any time you need clarification of these instructions, please do not hesitate to ask. Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
 
32 
 
Identification code ____________________ 
 
We are now asking for you to redo the questionnaire, which examines your own individual 
analysis of the four accounting cases, you just reviewed. We ask you to record your response, as 
you perceive the accountant described in the case ideally should respond to the ethical dilemma. 
It may help to think of your response as advice you, a member of a professional disciplinary 
committee, give to the accountant described in the case. He/she has requested your guidance on 
what is the most ethical solution to his/her dilemma and which factors are most critical for 
resolving the dilemma while maintaining the highest standard of ethical conduct. 
 
The instructions for filling out this questionnaire have not changed from when you filled it out 
previously. They are included for a reference. 
 
The cases have been carefully written to encourage you to consider what factors are important to 
the particular decision choice. Be sure that every form is complete. Please do not go back and 
change responses to cases that have already been completed. 
 
Once you finish one case, please proceed immediately to the next. When all four cases have been 
completed, place the completed questionnaire into its original envelope. Your assistance and 
cooperation are greatly appreciated. 
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Here is an illustration case and sample questionnaire. 
            Simon Fellows is thinking about buying a house. He is married, in his early thirties, has two small children, 
and earns an average income.  No additions to his family are planned.  His family has two cars and his wife 
works. Simon comes to you for advice as to whether he should or should not buy a house. 
            
Should Simon buy a house? (Check one)  X Yes __Can't decide __No  
            
In the process of advising Simon whether or not he should buy the house, you may consider many 
different issues to be important. Below is a list of some of these issues. On the left-hand side of each 
statement check the space, which best corresponds to the importance you believe should be given to the 
particular consideration.  (For instance, if you think that statement #1 should be of great importance in 
making a decision about buying a house, check the space on the left). 
            IMPORTANCE: 
            
Great 
uch 
Some Little No        
X       1.  Whether Simon can afford a suitable house. (Note in 
this example, the person taking the questionnaire 
thought that Simon should place great weight on this 
consideration in reaching his decision). 
 
 
   X   2.  Whether the furnace on the house was thermal dynamic 
(Note that if a statement sounds like gibberish, nonsense 
or is not relevant to the question at hand; mark it of "no 
importance"). 
 X      3.  Whether Simon could still go on his annual golf 
vacation. 
X       4.  Whether Simon’s wife wants to buy a house. 
            
From the list above, rank the four items of the greatest importance to an “ideal” response: 
            
Most 
important 
 Second most 
important 
 Third most 
important 
 Fourth most 
important 
 
 
 
Included in the questionnaire are some words and sentences that are not clear or do not make sense. Please 
mark these “no” of no importance and do not include them in your ranking. 
 
Note in this example, the top choices come from those statements that were checked on the left-hand side – 
statements #1 and #4 were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the most important, a person 
would reread #1 and #4, then pick one of them as the “most important” and put the other one as “second 
most important”. Statement #3 would be ranked as the net highest importance; therefore, #3 would be put 
beside the “third most important” choice. Finally, statement #2 was of the fourth highest importance; 
therefore, #2 would be put beside the “forth most important” choice. 
 
Please do not go back and change responses to cases that you have already completed. Once you finish one 
case, please proceed immediately to the next. Your assistance and cooperation are greatly appreciated. 
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ETHICAL DILEMMAS OF ACCOUNTANTS 
 
We ask you to respond to the following four cases as you 
perceive the accountant, ideally, ought to in the described 
situation. It might help to think of you as a member of a 
professional disciplinary committee whose role is to 
advise on the ideal way in which the situation described in 
the case should be resolved. Your mandate is to identify 
the four most important factors, which, ideally, should be 
critical of the ethical resolution of the described dilemma. 
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ALICE AND THE ABC COMPANY 
Alice is a senior auditor and a CPA for a national CPA firm that provides auditing, tax and consulting 
services.  The firm has developed a package called the ACME ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, which is sold to the 
general public as well as to the firm's clients.  Alice is the auditor in charge of the fieldwork on the ABC 
Company, Inc. audit.  During the course of this audit assignment, Alice is asked to evaluate the quality control 
of the accounting system, which happens to be the ACME package.  Alice uncovers several severe control 
weaknesses in the ACME system.  Before rendering the management letter to ABC management, Alice is told 
by her boss to modify the negative comments regarding the ACME package. 
Ideally, should Alice amend the management letter? (Check one) 
___Should amend it   ___Can't decide ___Should not amend it 
In the process of advising Alice whether or not she should amend the management letter, many items need 
to be considered. Below is a list of some of these issues. Please indicate the importance of each of the 
following considerations: 
Importance:          
Great 
uch 
Some Little No        
       1. Whether the weaknesses in the ACME system 
may be easily remedied by compensating controls. 
       2. Wouldn’t a good employee defer to her superior’s 
judgment? 
       3. Whether Alice’s job may be threatened by her 
refusal to revise the letter. 
       4. Whether fair deliberation on the client’s financial 
position can predict professional reputation. 
 
 
      5. What is best for Alice’s firm? 
       6. Whether or not Alice has a duty to ensure that the 
management letter is accurate. 
       7. What is the potential value of an independent 
audit in lieu of society’s current perspective on an 
enterprise’s net worth? 
 
 
      8. How is society best served? 
       9. Whether any clients really care about internal 
control issues or if all they ever really want is a 
clean audit opinion. 
     10. Would amending the management letter be 
consistent with what Alice thinks is right? 
     11. What action would Alice’s peers in the audit firm 
expect her to take? 
     12. What factors are relevant in determining Alice’s 
professional responsibility? 
From the list above, rank the four items of the greatest importance to an “ideal” response: 
Most 
important 
 2nd most 
important 
 3rd most 
important 
 4th most 
important 
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BILL AND DOGWOOD CONSTRUCTION 
Bill is a staff auditor and CPA for a small firm that provides auditing services.  The President of the Dogwood 
Construction Corporation is searching for a Chief Financial Officer, and has asked Bill to help recruit and 
select an appropriate candidate.  Bill is the "in-charge" auditor on the Dogwood engagement, which is among 
the largest and most profitable jobs for the firm.  Bill truly believes that he can provide a valuable service to 
Dogwood as well as his firm by performing the function. In addition, Bill already knows an individual, a 
personal friend, who has the right qualifications for this very important position. 
Ideally, should Bill assist Dogwood's president? (Check one) 
___Should assist him     ___Can't decide     ___Should not assist him 
In the process of advising Bill whether or not he should assist Dogwood’s president, many different issues 
need to be considered. Below is a list of some of these issues. Please indicate the importance of each of 
the following considerations: 
Importance:      
    
Great 
uch 
Some Little No    
    
       1. What effect will Bill’s refusal have on his firm’s 
relationship with the client? 
       2. Whether Bill has the right to assist a client in the 
selection and recruitment of a Chief Financial 
Officer. 
       3. Whether employment referrals ought to be in the 
hands on a few greedy headhunters. 
       4. Does telling his friend the job is available 
constitute an infringement of Bill’s professional 
responsibilities? 
       5. Will having a friend as the controller prevent Bill 
from making a fair assessment of the firm’s 
financial position in the future? 
       6. Whether Bill is overweight or has a weakness for 
fast food. 
       7. Whether the audit partner of the Dogwood audit 
will endorse Bill’s actions. 
       8. Wouldn’t a good auditor refuse to assist 
Dogwood’s president? 
       9. What actions would Bill’s friend expect him to 
take? 
     10. Would it be fair to other clients of the firm if Bill 
assisted Dogwood’s president? 
     11. Would assisting the president in any way violate 
the rights of others? 
     12. Would refusing to assist the president be 
consistent with what Bill thinks is right? 
From the list above, rank the four items of the greatest importance to an “ideal” response: 
Most 
important 
 2nd most 
important 
 3rd most 
important 
 4th most 
important 
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JOHN AND THE FOLDERS’ AUDIT 
John is a CPA and the senior in charge of the fieldwork for two legally unrelated audit clients: the Folders 
Company and Colby Corporation.  While on the Folders job, John learns that Colby is the only supplier of a 
product that is critical to the manufacturing of Folders' final output.  Colby is the only vendor in the 
marketplace.  The next day, John learns from Colby's management that they are greatly increasing the price of 
their primary products--and the new pricing policy can bankrupt Folders.  John knows that Folders recently 
considered the acquisition of a small company in Asia that with some effort can redirect its production to 
produce a product similar to the one made by Colby. However, the estimated unit cost was greater than the 
present (known and assumed stable) prices offered by Colby.  Based on their limited information, Folders did 
not seriously consider the purchase of this small company. 
Ideally, should John disclose Colby's plans to Folders? (Check one) 
___Yes     ___Can't decide     ___No 
In the process of advising John whether or not he should disclose Colby’s plans to Folders, many different 
items need to be considered. Below is a list of some of these issues. Please indicate the importance of each 
of the following items to John’s response: 
Importance:          
Great 
uch 
Some Little No        
       1. Is John obliged to maintain client confidentiality 
regardless of circumstance? 
       2. Whether the partner on the audit will endorse 
John’s actions. 
 
 
      3. What is best for the reputation of John’s firm? 
       4. Whether Folders’ reliance on a single supplier is 
disclosed in the financial statements. 
       5. Whether client confidentiality is the ultimate 
prelude to the necessity of rendering an audit 
opinion. 
       6. Which course of action will bring about the 
greatest good for all society? 
       7. How will others perceive John’s actions in the 
audit firm? 
       8. Whether the Folders Company brought this upon 
itself by relying solely upon one supplier. 
       9. Whether John’s actions will go against regulatory 
standards with respect to insider information. 
     10. What values are the bases for determining which 
stakeholder’s interest takes precedence when they 
conflict? 
     11. Would John’s action be consistent with what he 
believes is just? 
     12. Whether the reputation of the audit profession will 
suffer if Folders goes bankrupt. 
From the list above, rank the four items of the greatest importance to an “ideal” response: 
Most 
important 
 2nd most 
important 
 3rd most 
important 
 4th most 
important 
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BOB AND CORA LIMITED 
Bob is a brand new partner in a medium-size audit firm. Bob has inherited a large amount of business as a 
result of the unanticipated demise of one of the firm's founders. In fact, Bob has had the good fortune to be 
granted the audit of the firm's largest and oldest client, Cora Limited, and its 70 percent-owned subsidiary, 
Corinne Incorporated. Bob discovers that Cora Limited has historically been charging an exorbitant 
management fee to Corinne Incorporated. Bob is concerned that the interests of the minority shareholders of 
Corinne Incorporated are materially compromised by such an arrangement. In discussions with the client, Bob 
learns that this procedure was undertaken several years ago upon the advice of his own firm's tax department. 
This procedure is used to boost Cora's earnings to take advantage of significant tax savings that would 
otherwise be lost to Cora Limited. Cora's management is not amenable to losing these tax savings. The 
magnitude of all related party transactions between Cora Limited and Corinne Incorporated is disclosed in the 
financial statements as required by accounting standards. Consequently, submits Cora’s management, the 
financial statements of Cora Limited and Corinne Incorporated are fairly presented. 
Ideally, should Bob insist on separate disclosure of the management fee by Cora Limited? 
___Yes     ___Can't decide     ___No 
In the process of advising Bob on whether or not he should insist that Cora disclose the management fee, 
many different issues need to be considered. Below is a list of some of these issues. Please indicate the 
importance of each of the following considerations: 
Importance:          
Great 
uch 
Some Little No        
       1. Whether other partners in the firm will support 
Bob’s position. 
       2. Would it be fair to the tax department if Bob did 
not insist that the management fee be disclosed? 
       3. Whether anybody really cares about GAAP in his 
or her efforts to exploit everyone else. 
       4. Whether a retroactive adjustment to the financial 
statements is required. 
       5. Whether or not disclosure of the management fee 
would benefit more people to a greater extent. 
       6. What is the quintessence of an audit apart from 
displacement, especially for minority 
shareholders? 
       7. Is Bob obliged by professional standards to assess 
the reasonableness of the management fee? 
       8. Whether it is generally accepted that firms 
manipulate the amount of management fees 
between associated companies to minimize their 
tax liability. 
       9. What is the financial importance of the Cora audit 
to Bob’s firm? 
     10. Doesn’t Bob have a professional duty to protect 
the rights of minority shareholders? 
     11. Would Bob’s decision be consistent with his own 
personal beliefs? 
     12. What values are the bases for governing fair 
presentation when conventional reporting 
practices do not result in full disclosure? 
From the list above, rank the four items of the greatest importance to an “ideal” response: 
Most 
important 
 2nd most 
important 
 3rd most 
important 
 4th most 
important 
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Table 1:  Mean Descriptive Characteristics of Subjects in Total and 
 by Experimental Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
Prescriptive  
 
Deliberative 
 
Total 
 
 
 
Gender (percent male) 
(Standard deviation) 
 
.49 
(.5) 
 
.53 
(.5) 
 
.51 
(.5) 
 
 
 
Average Age 
(Standard deviation) 
 
28 years 
(5.5) 
 
28 years 
(5.3) 
 
28 years 
(5.4) 
 
 
 
Average work experience in an 
audit firm 
(Standard deviation) 
 
3.4 years 
 
(3) 
 
3.3 years 
 
(3) 
 
3.4 years 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
CA designation (percent) 
(Standard deviation) 
 
.22 
(.4) 
 
.28 
(.5) 
 
.25 
(.4) 
 
 
 
DIT score 
(Standard deviation) 
 
37.3 
(17.0) 
 
39.9 
(17.0) 
 
38.6 
(16.9) 
 
 
 
Years of post-secondary education 
completed 
(Standard deviation) 
 
4 
 
(.9) 
 
4 
 
(.9) 
 
4 
 
(.8) 
 
 
 
Total sample size 
 
 90 
 
90 
 
180 
 
 
 
* there are no significant differences in attributes between experimental groups 
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Table 2: DIT scores by Experimental Condition 
 
Prescriptive Condition 
 
 
 
Predominantly High 
Discussion Groups 
 
Predominantly Low 
Discussion Groups 
 
Majority members-DIT 
score 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
53.1 
(10.4) 
36 
 
26.2 
(9.2) 
36 
 
Minority members-DIT 
score 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
26.2 
(9.2) 
9 
 
55.6 
(12.5) 
9 
 
t-value for equality of 
means 
Significance 
 
7.01 
p<0.00 
 
7.92 
p<0.00 
 
Deliberative Condition 
 
Majority members-DIT 
score 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
50.3 
(10.2) 
36 
 
23.9 
(10.0) 
36 
 
Minority members-DIT 
score 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
22.2 
(9.2) 
9 
 
53.7 
(10.9) 
9 
 
t-value for equality of 
means 
Significance 
 
7.47 
p<0.00 
 
7.80 
p<0.00 
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Table 3: ANOVA of the ABSOLUTE_REVISION to ethical reasoning scores 
assigned to the prescriptive condition. 
 
EFFECT 
 
Source of Variation 
 
DF 
 
MS 
 
F 
 
p-value 
 
FACTORS 
 
WITHIN + RESIDUAL 
LEVEL 
CONTEXT 
LEVEL*CONTEXT 
LEVEL*GROUP 
within CONTEXT 
 
GROUP within 
CONTEXT 
 
 54 
1 
1 
1 
16 
 
16 
 
59  
35 
 60 
271 
121 
 
113 
 
 
0.60 
1.03 
4.62 
2.07 
 
1.93 
 
 
0.22 
0.16 
0.02 
0.01 
 
0.02 
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Table 4: Absolute Revision to Prescriptive Ethical Reasoning Scores by Group  
 
Majority members-absolute revision 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
9.6 
(7.9) 
72 
 
Minority members-absolute revision 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
14.0 
(11.1) 
18 
 
t-value for equality of means 
Significance 
 
1.9 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Absolute Revision to Deliberative Ethical Reasoning Scores by Group  
 
Majority members-absolute revision 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
10.1 
(8.0) 
72 
 
Minority members-absolute revision 
(standard deviation) 
n 
 
7.7 
(7.0) 
18 
 
t-value for equality of means 
Significance 
 
1.14 
0.13 
 
 
